nominal variables are assumed to be more economical than frequent small changes.' The models also share the assumption that the time between successive price revisions is preset, and hence unresponsive to shocks to the economy. This assumption is questionable both at the macroeconomic level and in the aggregate. Formal microeconomic models (e.g., Sheshinski and Weiss [1983] ) strongly suggest that more rapid inflation will shorten the time between price revisions. Empirical evidence against the fixed timing assumption is presented by Cecchetti [1986] and Liebermann and Zilbefarb [1985] . -The present paper assumes that individual firms adjust their prices using (s,S) pricing policies of Sheshinski and Weiss [1977, 1983] . To model asynchronization, we make a cross-sectional assumption on initial prices. The price level is derived endogenously by aggregating across firms. Aggregate price stickiness then vanishes despite the presence of nominal price rigidity and imperfectly synchronized price revisions.
The presence of relative price variability as a consequence of inflation is also observed endogenously through aggregation of cross-sectional price data. A simple formula is derived linking nominal price adjustment by firms with cross-sectional variability of inflation rates.
The basic model is outlined in Section II. The neutrality proposition is presented in Section III. In Section IV the model is applied to study relative price variability. Section V provides further discussion of the model and its assumptions. Conclusions are given in Section VI.
II. THE MODEL

IIA. The Aggregate Setting
We provide an aggregate model of price dynamics with individual firms pursuing asynchronous (s,S) pricing policies. The structure of the aggregate model is kept as simple as possible to highlight the distinction between our model and others with asynchronous price and wage decisions. These alternative models frequently assume a staggered pattern of timing (e.g., Akerlof [1969] , Fischer [1977] , Taylor [1980] , and Blanchard [1983] ).
Money growth is subject to continuous shocks. The stochastic process governing monetary growth is taken as exogenous by all firms in the economy.2 Let M(t) denote the logarithm of the money supply at time t, where time is measured continuously. We assume that the money supply process is increasing over time and does not make discrete jumps. The monotonicity assumption will rule out periods of deflation. The continuity assumption allows a simple characterization of firm pricing policies. The assumption also plays a role in analyzing the cross-sectional behavior of prices. This issue is taken up below. The monetary process is sufficiently general as to accommodate feedback rules. We shall consider particular examples of monetary processes below.
There is a continuum of firms in the economy indexed by i E [0,1]. All firms face identical demand and cost conditions. The assumed macroeconomic structure is based on the menu cost model of Weiss [1977, 1983] . Let qi(t) and Q(t) represent firm i's nominal price and the aggregate price index, respectively, with pi(t) and P(t) their respective logarithms. The aggregate price index, P(t), is derived endogenously below from individual firm prices. It is convenient to express firm i's real price, q (t)/Q (t), in log form, ri(t),
(1) ri(t) 3pi(t) -P(t) = In [qi(t)/Q(t)], for all i E [0,1]. We take ri(0) as given.
The aggregate price index Q (t) is determined endogenously by aggregating individual firms' nominal prices qi(t). The index is assumed to depend only on the frequency distribution over nominal prices. Because firms have menu costs of price adjustment, prices may remain dispersed in the long run. Thus, the set of observed prices at any date may be described by a time-dependent frequency distribution function, say Gt (q). The index is assumed also to 2. In general, the money growth process may be set as a feedback rule based on the history of output. 
IIB. The Market Setting
Consumer demand is assumed to depend only on the firm's real price and on real money balances. Writing the arguments in log form, consumer demand faced by firm i, ri, is defined by ( 
4) ri (t) -r(ri (t) ^ M (t) -P (t)),
where ri(t) and M(t) -P(t) are the log of firm i's price and the log of real balances, respectively.5 One rationale for this is to assume that real balances enter consumer utility functions, as in, for example, Rotemberg [1982 Rotemberg [ , 1983 . Note also that all firms can have 3. Individual firms set s and S taking the price level as exogenously given. However, for given levels s and S, the index endogenously determines P(O): will the exogenous and endogenous indices be consistent? The answer is generally no: however, if we associate higher real balances with higher levels of s and S, there will be some initial specification of real balances guaranteeing this static consistency, since higher real balances raise the desired average real price, raising the endogenous level of P(O) relative to the exogenous level.
4. Blanchard and Kiyotaki [1985] and Ball and Romer [1986] derive symmetric price indices based on an underlying symmetric utility framework.
5. The assumption that demand is independent of future prices rules out consumer speculation. Benabou [1985a] presents an analysis of optimal pricing policies in the face of consumer storage and speculation. In principle, the future path of real money balances may also influence real demand. For present purposes, Proposition 1 will allow us to ignore this potentially complex dependence. some positive demand even though prices are dispersed. This may arise if the commodities are imperfect substitutes. It may also be that consumer search across firms is costly and that consumers do not recall prices posted by firms in earlier periods (see Benabou [1985b1) .
Costs are assumed to be fixed in real terms. Production at rate Xi(t) gives rise to real flow costs, C(Xi(t)). This assumption rules out stickiness in nominal input prices, including contractual wages. This prevents us from addressing the relationship between price stickiness and wage stickiness, a topic of independent interest (see Blanchard [1983] ).6 Additional study of the present model with input price stickiness is clearly desirable. All profits are distributed to consumers, and firm costs accrue to consumers as income.7
The good is assumed to be nonstorable, so that the firm's output is supplied at the same date it is produced. This removes intertemporal linkages embodied in inventories. As a result, the only variables that influence the firm's flow rate of real profits Bi(t) are the instantaneous real price and the level of real money Let X (t) represent the constant dollar value of aggregate output:
In the absence of menu costs, the firm picks its instantaneous price ri(t) to maximize flow profits B (ri(t), M(t) -P(t)).9 Nominal price stickiness is introduced into the model in the form of a real 6. Gordon [1981] finds evidence for price stickiness for periods with widely different forms of labor contract. This suggests that there are important sources of price stickiness other than the behavior of input prices.
7. By Walras' law, market clearing in the commodity market implies market clearing in the money market; see, for example, Rotemberg [1982] .
8. The present formulation allows the firm to ration its customers. The case without rationing can also be handled by the model; see Sheshinski and Weiss [1983] .
9. With standard assumptions, increases in real money balances that increase demand for the commodity will also raise the firm's optimal real price. 
7) ri(t) -ri(0) = (pi(t) -pi(O)) -(P(t) -P(0)) = ki(t)D -(P(t) -P(O)).
10. There is an issue here concerning the proper treatment of menu costs. If these are indeed real costs, they should be explicitly included as part of output. Hence a closed model of the economy should properly include a sector of variable size dedicated to the production of menus. This is ignored in our formulation.
Hence, changes in the log of the firm's real price are an integer multiple of D minus the log of the price level.
Two important requirements are necessary for (s,S)-type policies to be optimal. One requirement is stationarity of real balances over time-M(t) -P(t) = -P(O), so that demand ri is stationary. We shall demonstrate that in equilibrium this requirement is satisfied. The other requirement concerns restrictions on the form of the anticipated inflation process. Conditions for optimality of (s, S) pricing policies in a stochastic setting have been considered by Sheshinski and Weiss [1983] , Danziger [1984] , and more recently by Caplin and Sheshinski [1987] .11 Danziger considers a world with discrete inflationary shocks. He demonstrates that when inflationary shocks arrive one at a time with exponentially distributed interarrival times, then the optimal pricing policy is of the (s,S) variety.12 With general inflationary processes, the optimal pricing policy may take a more complex form.
The central qualitative feature of (s,S) pricing policies is that they make the time between successive price revisions endogenous: prices change more frequently when inflation is rapid than when it is slow. Alternative models of asynchronous price setting involve fixed decision times regardless of ensuing shocks to the economy. Seen in this light, one may be less concerned with the precise optimality of (s,S) pricing policies.13 Rather, they may be seen as a simple and tractable alternative to the assumption of a predetermined pattern of price revisions.
Analysis of the time path of aggregate prices in our framework requires specification of the initial distribution of prices across firms in the economy. It is assumed that firms' initial real prices rj(0) are uniformly distributed over the range (s,S]. For ease of exposition we restate the uniformity assumption with a frequency distribution Fo(p) which defines the proportion of firms with the logs of their initial prices pi(0) no higher than p. 12. While the discrete nature of Danziger's inflation process contradicts Assumption 1, our analysis including the neutrality proposition nevertheless applies.
13. Even in the inventory literature, Arrow, Harris, and Marschak [1951] study (s,S) policies because of their relative simplicity. The first general proof of optimality is due to Scarf [1959] . Further, stationary (s,S) policies are frequently analyzed and applied in situations where they are undoubtedly suboptimal (such as in multi-echelon inventory systems [Schwarz, 1981] The uniform initial distribution of prices across the price range (sS ] is the analogue in prices of the standard assumption of uniformly staggered price changes over time. Indeed, Assumption 3 is equivalent to an assumption of uniform staggered timing in the special case where inflation is constant at some rate X > 0. However, it will be apparent that in a stochastic setting a uniform distribution of initial prices has significantly different implications. In a fundamental sense Assumption 3 may be viewed as a statement about the endogenous tendency of prices to become uniformly distributed after a long history of inflationary shocks and pursuit of fixed (s,S) policies. This lies outside the current framework, since firms pursuing identical (s,S) policies in the face of inflation retain forever the initial difference in their real prices. However, if firms pursue slightly distinct (s,S) policies, or randomize on their trigger price s (as in Benabou [1985a] ), their real prices become statistically independent of one another with the passage of time. A related result for inventories states that, absent degeneracies, firms that pursue (s, S) inventory policies have inventory levels that are independent in the long run [Caplin, 1985] Monetary policy may influence the distribution of real prices across firms in our model as will be seen in Section IV. However, these distributional effects cancel out in the aggregate. Suppose that firms follow (s,S) policies in anticipation of constant real balances. That is, firms expect that P(t) = M(t). Then, by the description of (s,S) pricing policies in equation (7), we may calculate each firm's nominal price as a function of cumulative money growth and the firm's initial price: The frequency distribution over nominal prices is then given by Gt(q) Ft(ln q). Note that Gt(q) is defined over (es+M(t),eS+M(t)].
Thus, we may define Gt(eM(t)x) over (es,eS) so that Gt(eM(t)x) Go(x) for x Q (eses). Therefore, by the assumption of a symmetric The central feature of Proposition 1 is that it provides a simple framework in which there are monetary shocks, asynchronous nominal price revisions, but no stickiness in the aggregate price level. In fact, P(t) -M(t) = P(M). Thus it contrasts strongly with monetary models with a fixed staggered pattern of price and wage revisions, which can generate significant aggregate price stickiness (e.g., Akerlof [1969] , Blanchard [1983] , and Fischer [1977] ). In qualitative terms, the difference between the results can be simply explained. In the staggered timing framework, large monetary shocks draw a response from a fixed fraction of the population, with the remainder pursuing an unchanged policy. The size of the predetermined pool of decision makers will influence the extent of price revision by those currently free to decide: on average, agents' prices adjust only partially to large monetary shocks. In contrast, the (s,S) model makes the fraction of firms that revise prices in any given period endogenous. Hence rapid growth of the money supply causes an increase in the number of price increases in a given period. Surprisingly, our simple form of endogenous timing completely removes aggregate inertia.
The result also provides a new perspective on the emerging study of menu costs and monetary policy in a static setting (e.g., Akerlof [1985] argue that the presence of a small menu cost may make it optimal for an individual firm to maintain a fixed nominal price in the face of a monetary shock. This may lead to a welfare loss larger than the menu cost itself. The extension from the case of a single firm to the economy as a whole is based on a representative agent framework. Since one firm fails to adjust its price, so do all firms, and as a result the open market operation can have a significant real impact.
Taken literally, such reasoning can only be applied for the first monetary shock to an economy that had never before been out of static equilibrium. Even the second monetary shock may have a different effect, since after the first shock, the hypothesis that the initial real price is at its equilibrium level fails. Proposition 1 presents a simple setting where the presence of menu costs indeed prevents many firms from revising prices. However, those who do adjust their price do so discontinuously. Although only a few firms may adjust their prices, they adjust their prices by a large amount. The net result is that monetary shocks are absorbed with no real impact.
Proposition 1 Proposition 1 demonstrates that with identical firms, consistent aggregation requires that firms be uniformly distributed in terms of the log of their initial real price levels rather than the time of their last price change. The distinction is that in a stochastic setting uniformity in timing is unstable, while uniformity in real prices is continuously sustained.14
IV. MENU COSTS AND RELATIVE PRICE VARIABILITY
In this section we develop formulae linking inflation and firm pricing policies to relative price variability. These formulae can be seen as stochastic generalizations of the deterministic price dispersion models of Rotemberg [1981] , and Cecchetti [1985] , which are based on staggered price setting. Our results also clarify the 14. In a deterministic world with constant inflation, the two forms of uniformity are equivalent. relationship between price variability and the time period between successive observations of the economy.15
The association between inflation and relative price variability has been widely investigated; see Fischer [1981] for a survey. The empirical research suggests a positive association between relative price variability and both the mean and the variance of the overall rate of inflation.16 One important line of research into inflation and relative prices originates with Barro [1976] . Here it is inflationary variability rather than the rate of inflation per se that drives relative price variability. As the variability of inflation increases, individual firm estimates of inflation become more widely dispersed, driving apart firms' preset prices. Our results of this section require only that I1T(t) is a stationary stochastic process. It is also convenient to restrict attention to inflation or money supply processes that are regularly behaved. Proof of Proposition 2. To simplify notation, the superscriptis suppressed throughout the proof. We first separate period t inflation in the standard manner, A desirable feature of the two-rate inflation processes of Assumption 1B is that their simple Markovian structure is inherited by the discretely observed process 117(t). The state of the system at time t comprises a specification of all firms' instantaneous real prices ri(t), and the current inflation rate, H or L. State transitions in the ensuing interval depend only on cumulative inflation over the interval, and the level of inflation at the end of the interval. Such state transitions are then Markovian, since information available prior to t is irrelevant to the probabilistic progress of the system.22
With this background, we can provide the simple formulae of Proposition 3 which apply, respectively, to "widely spaced" and to "closely spaced" observations of the economy. The Proposition is proved in the Appendix. policies, the monetary process must at least exhibit monotonicity and continuity. These requirements may be quite restrictive. When the monetary process is nonmonotone, it will sometimes be necessary for the firm to lower its nominal price. The one-sided (s,S) pricing policies must be replaced by two-sided pricing policies, as analyzed by Barro [1972] .24 With the two-sided pricing policies, the neutrality proposition no longer holds: it may even be that unusually rapid monetary expansion is associated with increased real balances and vice versa.25 A theoretical difficulty in modeling two-sided policies is that their properties under aggregation appear highly complex. Specifically, it is not possible to specify an initial cross-sectional distribution of prices which survives shocks.26 In economic terms, this implies that a second positive shock to the money supply may have very different effects than the first positive shock. Such effects may well have non-intuitive implications: for example, after two successive positive shocks, output may be higher in response to a negative than in response to a third positive shock to the money supply. In the absence of a fully developed model, such comments remain speculative.
The assumed continuity of the money supply process has two roles. First, it gives rise to the simple form of the individual firm equations for price transitions. In particular, (7) no longer holds in the absence of continuity, since if the real price falls by a discrete amount at any given instant, then it may at some point fall strictly below s. The immediate response of increasing the real price to S then involves a discrete jump in the real price in excess of D Ss, contradicting (7). Sample path continuity plays an additional role in relation to the uniformity Assumption 3. Jumps in the price level act as a coordinating device, pulling many firms in the economy to adjust at the same instant, and eliminating uniformity. The uniform distribution over initial prices, however, is the only distribution that is invariant to shocks.
Finally, there are conditions under which alternative pricing policies may be optimal. Significant alterations in the monetary process may lead agents to revise trigger points.27 One possibility is that a sudden increase in the rate and variability of money growth causes all agents to broaden their trigger range, raising S and lowering s. In this case, real balances may rise in the short run as firms find insufficient benefit from a price change. This increase in real balances corresponds to the effect noted in the literature on the impact of menu costs in a static setting, as in Akerlof The model illustrates that individual firm price stickiness and staggered timing need not lead to aggregate price stickiness. This suggests that real effects of money shocks may depend more on fixed-length contracts than simply on asynchronous nominal price adjustment. Overall, the analysis highlights the importance of cross-sectional timing assumptions in macroeconomic models. for any given e Q (0,1). To confirm this, pick a time interval i below E(D/gH), so that the maximal inflation rate in any given period is below eD. Then,
(A7) E[bT(t)(D -bT(t))] = E[117(t)(D -br(t))] < DE(ll7(t)).
In addition, (A8) E[bT(t)(D -bT(t))] 2E[H11(t)(D-ED)] = (1 -E)DE[flu (t)].
Together, (A7) and (A8) establish part (b).
Q.E.D.
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